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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
SONG FI, INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
GOOGLE INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
No. 14-cv-05080-CW    
 
 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
(Dkt Nos. 211, 212, 221, 226) 
 
Before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary 
judgment.  Plaintiffs Song Fi, Inc., Rasta Rock, Inc., Joseph N. 
Brotherton, and N.G.B. move for summary judgment on Defendants 
Google Inc. and Youtube, LLC’s first, second, third, fifth, 
sixth, seventh, and ninth affirmative defenses, as well as 
summary adjudication of the fact that Defendants have harmed 
others by using the same take-down notice, which is relevant to 
their claims for exemplary damages.  Docket No. 221.  Defendants 
move for summary judgment on both of Plaintiffs’ affirmative 
claims, libel and tortious interference.  Docket No. 212.  On 
December 19, 2017, the parties appeared for a hearing on both 
motions.  Having considered the papers and the arguments of 
counsel, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion and GRANTS 
Defendants’ motion.   
BACKGROUND 
Rasta Rock produced “Luv ya,” a music video featuring a five 
year-old boy (N.G.B.) and five-year girl who dress up and go to a 
restaurant for lunch on Valentine’s Day.  See Declaration of 
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Joseph Brotherton (Brotherton Decl.), Ex. 3.  Rasta Rock Opera, a 
music group which includes Joseph Brotherton, performs a song in 
the background.  See id.  Song Fi has an ownership interest in 
Rasta Rock and publishes and distributes Rasta Rock Opera’s 
music.  Declaration of Samuel Dippo (Dippo Decl.), Ex. 2 (Song Fi 
Depo. Trans.) at 48, 89.  Song Fi also aims to create a 
revolutionary music platform for the distribution of other 
artists’ music, but has never launched its product.  Id. at 43.  
On February 14, 2014, Song fi uploaded the “Luv ya” music video 
to YouTube, a service that allows users to upload videos that can 
be viewed by people around the world.  Id. at 88-89; Declaration 
of Katie Hushion Haas (Haas Decl.) ¶¶ 2, 4.  In doing so, Song Fi 
agreed to the then-effective YouTube Terms of Service (TOS).  
Haas Decl. ¶ 2-3. 
YouTube displays a view count for each video uploaded to the 
service, which indicates the number of times that YouTube 
believes people have requested to view the video.  Haas Decl. ¶ 
5.  In the two months that followed, “Luv ya” accumulated 
approximately 23,000 views.  Brotherton Decl. ¶ 2; Haas Decl. 
¶ 23.   
On April 18, 2014, YouTube removed “Luv ya,” replacing the 
music video with a statement that read, “This video has been 
removed because its content violated YouTube’s Terms of Service 
. . . Sorry about that.”  Docket No. 121 (Answer) ¶ 135; 
Declaration of Stephen Sieber, Ex. 2 (Notice).  YouTube reposted 
the video at a new URL, resetting the view count.  Haas Decl. ¶ 
16.  At this time, the video could no longer be seen at its 
original URL, and the page no longer referred to either Rasta 
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Rock or Song Fi.  Id. ¶ 18; see also Notice.  The Notice also 
linked to YouTube’s Community Guidelines, which provides 
information on the type of conduct that violates YouTube’s rules, 
including spam.  Dippo Decl., Ex. 25; Haas Decl. ¶ 18.  The 
Notice and the Community Guidelines are generic documents and 
were not specifically drafted to be used for the “Luv ya” video.  
Haas Decl. ¶ 19.  YouTube has posted the same Notice in thousands 
of other instances in 2014 where it removed videos for view count 
fraud and other violations.  Id.   
YouTube’s algorithms had detected over 188,000 fraudulent 
viewing requests for the “Luv ya” video, which were automatically 
marked as spam and blocked from the view count.  Declaration of 
Mohith Rao Kotagiri (Kotagiri Decl.) ¶ 11.  This triggered 
YouTube’s suspicions and prompted it to audit the “Luv ya” 
video’s view count.  Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 18; see also Sieber Decl., Ex. 
33 (Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 4).  The 
audit revealed that the pattern of traffic was “highly 
anomalous,” with sharp spikes of views on some days and almost no 
views on others, as well as a large percentage of views coming 
from the same types of devices and running on an outdated version 
of the operating system.  Haas Decl. ¶ 22; Kotagiri Decl. ¶¶ 15-
18; Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 4; Dippo 
Decl., Ex. 4 (YouTube Depo. Trans.) 33-34, 79-80. 
Shortly thereafter, on April 22, 2014, Rasta Rock Opera 
founder Stephen Sieber (also known as Stevie Marco) contacted 
YouTube to attempt to reinstate the video’s view count through 
YouTube’s appeal process.  Haas Decl. ¶ 21; Dippo Decl., Ex. 26.  
That same day, YouTube responded that the removal of “Luv ya” was 
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justified due to a violation of Section 4H.  Id.  YouTube advised 
that it had reinstated the video on a new URL, without previous 
views, likes, and comments.  Id.  It further advised that Section 
4H prohibits use of any automated system such as “robots,” 
“spiders,” or “offline readers” that access the service “in a 
manner that sends more request messages to the YouTube servers in 
a given period of time than a human can reasonably produce in the 
same period by using a conventional on-line web browser.”  Id.  
Moreover, Section 4H also prohibits gaining views through other 
automated or deceptive means.  Id.   
On May 12, 2014, counsel for Plaintiffs wrote a letter to 
David Drummond, a member of Google’s Board of Directors and Chief 
Legal Officer.  Dippo Decl., Ex. 27.  This letter stated that it 
constituted “notice that YouTube’s arbitrary removal of, and 
continued refusal to reinstate, Mr. Marco’s video is interfering, 
without justification, with Song Fi and Mr. Marco’s prospective 
economic relationships.”  Id.  The letter requested that the 
video be reinstated or that YouTube provide firm evidence of a 
violation of YouTube’s TOS.  Id.  On July 22, 2014, counsel for 
Plaintiffs sent a letter to YouTube’s CEO Susan Wojcicki 
attaching a copy of the May 12, 2014 letter as well as a draft 
version of the complaint in this case.  Dippo Decl., Exs. 28-29.   
Three days later, on July 25, 2014, Song fi filed this 
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.  Docket No. 1.  The court denied Song fi’s motion for a 
TRO and preliminary injunction and transferred the case to this 
district.  Docket Nos. 12, 19-21.  On a series of motions to 
dismiss, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of 
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contract, libel per se, violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies 
Act and the Cartwright Act, and fraud.  Docket Nos. 53, 97, 115.  
Only Plaintiffs’ claims for libel per quod and tortious 
interference remain.  
LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and 
disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the 
evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is 
clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 
Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is 
no material factual dispute.  Therefore, the court must regard as 
true the opposing party’s evidence, if supported by affidavits or 
other evidentiary material.  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 
815 F.2d at 1289.  The court must draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.  
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 
F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).   
Material facts which would preclude entry of summary 
judgment are those which, under applicable substantive law, may 
affect the outcome of the case.  The substantive law will 
identify which facts are material.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on 
an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of 
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production by either of two methods:   
 
The moving party may produce evidence negating an 
essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or, 
after suitable discovery, the moving party may show 
that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence 
of an essential element of its claim or defense to 
carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.  
Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 
F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). 
If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an 
absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or 
defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the 
absence of a material fact on such issues, or to support its 
motion with evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim.  Id.; 
see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); 
Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991).  
If the moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the 
non-moving party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving 
party to produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or 
admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.”  
Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409.  
If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an 
essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it 
must produce affirmative evidence of such negation.  Nissan, 210 
F.3d at 1105.  If the moving party produces such evidence, the 
burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific 
evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists.  Id. 
If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of 
production by either method, the non-moving party is under no 
obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition.  
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Id.  This is true even though the non-moving party bears the 
ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.  Id. at 1107. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ 
Affirmative Claims 
A. Libel Per Quod 
“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing 
. . . or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any 
person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes 
him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure 
him in his occupation.”  Cal. Civ. Code § 45.  California 
recognizes two types of libel: libel per se, which is defamatory 
on its face, and libel per quod, which a reasonable reader would 
be able to recognize “only by virtue of his or her knowledge of 
specific facts and circumstances, extrinsic to the publication, 
which are not matters of common knowledge rationally attributable 
to all reasonable persons.”  Bartholomew v. YouTube, LLC., 17 
Cal. App. 5th 1217, 1226-27 (2017) (quoting Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d, 377, 386-87 (1986)).  Libel per 
quod requires the plaintiff to prove that he or she has suffered 
special damages as a proximate result of the published statement.  
Id. at 1227.   
Defendants argue that Bartholomew v. YouTube is controlling.  
The California Court of Appeal considered issues and facts that 
are very similar to the ones in this case.  Bartholomew, a 
Christian musician, posted a music video on YouTube, which 
YouTube removed because of the use of automated systems to 
generate views.  17 Cal. App. 5th at 1221-22.  YouTube posted the 
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same Notice as that here, along with a link to what appears to be 
the same Community Guidelines.  Id. at 1222.  The Community 
Guidelines listed a number of potential violations, including 
“Sex and Nudity,” “Hate Speech,” “Shocking and Disgusting,” 
“Children,” “Copyright,” “Privacy,” and “Harassment.”  Id.  On 
demurrer, the court held that the Notice was not defamatory.  The 
court first noted that the law dictated that “[i]f no reasonable 
reader would perceive in a false and unprivileged publication a 
meaning which tended to injure the subject’s reputation in any of 
the enumerated respects, then there is no libel at all.”  Id. at 
1226.  It then held that “an Internet user with a reasonable 
working knowledge of the [sic] how internet hyperlinks work would 
have understood that the list on the Community Guideline Tips 
page is in fact general—that no one particular offense could be 
reasonably read to apply to Bartholomew’s video and that the 
categories applied to the many thousands of videos that YouTube 
might have had to remove for any number of reasons.”  Id. at 
1229.  The court further held: “Given the sheer breadth of the 
items covered in YouTube’s terms of service, and even taking into 
consideration Bartholomew’s profession, we do not think that the 
removal statement can be deemed to subject her to ‘hatred, 
contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or [cause her] to be shunned or 
avoided’ or tend to ‘injure [her] in [her] occupation.’”  Id. at 
1233.  Thus, the Notice could not be read to be making a 
defamatory statement of and concerning Bartholomew.  Id.  
 On matters of California law, this Court is “bound to follow 
the decisions of the California Court of Appeal unless there is 
convincing evidence that the California Supreme Court would hold 
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otherwise.”  Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 
889 (9th Cir. 2010).  Bartholomew involves essentially the same 
material facts as this case, including the same Notice and 
Community Guidelines posted by YouTube.  Moreover, the 
Bartholomew court’s reasoning is persuasive.  YouTube’s Notice is 
generic and does not identify any particular type of offense.  It 
refers to the Community Guidelines, which list a multitude of 
possible offenses that could have resulted in the removal of the 
video.  Accordingly, it is unlikely that any reasonable reader 
would interpret the Notice and Community Guidelines in such a way 
as to expose Plaintiffs to “to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or 
obloquy,” or cause them to be “shunned or avoided,” or to be 
injured in their occupation.  Cal. Civ. Code § 45.   
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Bartholomew by arguing 
that their video was about children, making it more likely that 
viewers would conclude that the “Children” section prohibiting 
“inappropriate children’s content” of the Community Guidelines 
applied and that Plaintiffs had engaged in “some serious 
wrongdoing involving children.”  Pl. Opp. at 7.  But the 
uncontroverted evidence shows that YouTube removed the video and 
any reference to Plaintiffs from the original URL and posted the 
Notice in its place.  See Original Notice; Haas Decl. ¶ 18.  
Thus, visitors to the original URL would not see that the video 
was about children, and would be unlikely to conclude that the 
section about “Children” applied.  Without more, a reasonable 
reader would not jump to the conclusion that the video involved 
inappropriate children’s content.  Moreover, the Bartholomew 
court rejected a similar argument.  Bartholomew, a Christian 
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musician, alleged that the Notice and Community Guidelines as a 
whole “imputed to her a want of character.”  Bartholomew, 17 Cal. 
App. 5th at 1222-24.  The court rejected this argument, stating 
that, “even taking into consideration Bartholomew’s profession,” 
the “sheer breadth of topics covered by the [Community 
Guidelines] simply cannot be reasonably read to apply to 
Bartholomew.”  Id. at 1232-33.  The same reasoning applies here.1   
Defendants separately argue that Plaintiffs cannot prove 
several of the required elements of their libel claim.  Several 
of these arguments provide alternative grounds for granting 
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ libel claim. 
Defendants challenge that Plaintiffs have provided no 
evidence that any third party actually understood the statement 
as defamatory and about Plaintiffs.  See Palm Springs Tennis Club 
v. Rangel, 73 Cal. App. 4th 1, 5-7 (1999); Hecimovich v. Encinal 
Sch. Parent Teacher Org., 203 Cal. App. 4th 450 (2012).  
Plaintiffs point to the declarations of six individuals, provided 
for the first time with their opposition brief: Alexandre 
Abdoulaev, Jared Selikson, Yillah Natalie Rosenfeld, Derrick 
Sieber, Hieu Le, and Joseph Yu.  Defendants argue that the six 
declarants were not disclosed pursuant to Rule 26(a) and thus 
                     
1 Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the Bartholomew court 
distinguished an earlier decision in this case by noting that 
“the plaintiff was able to allege that it was associated with a 
specific wrongdoing, ‘inappropriate children’s content.’”  Id. at 
1232 n.9 (citing Song Fi, Inc. v. Google, Inc. 2016 WL 1298999, 
*2-3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2016)).  But the Bartholomew court noted 
in the same footnote that it disagreed with this Court’s 
decision.  See id. (“To the extent that the two federal cases 
upon which Bartholomew relies come to a different conclusion, we 
respectfully disagree.”). 
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their declarations must be excluded pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 37.  “A party that does not timely identify a 
witness under Rule 26 may not use that witness to supply evidence 
at a trial ‘unless the failure was substantially justified or is 
harmless.’”  Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 768 F.3d 
843, 861 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)).  A 
district court has “wide latitude” to exclude witnesses pursuant 
to Rule 37.  Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 
F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001).  Plaintiffs apparently did not 
include these witnesses in their disclosures.  Nor did they 
produce any evidence from them during discovery, which closed in 
February 2017.  As a result, Defendants did not have an adequate 
opportunity to depose or seek discovery from these witnesses.  
Because Plaintiffs failed to disclose the six declarants, and 
their nondisclosure was not substantially justified or harmless, 
these declarants will be excluded from consideration.  
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence 
demonstrating that a third party actually understood the 
statement as defamatory and about them. 
Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs have no evidence 
of special damages.  Plaintiffs respond with the declarations of 
Joseph Brotherton, Derrick Sieber, and Stephen Sieber, which each 
state conclusorily that they lost financial opportunities because 
of YouTube’s removal of the video.  See, e.g., Brotherton Decl. 
¶ 4 (“I had been promised $2,000 by Stephen Sieber AKA ‘Stevie 
Marco’ in early April 2014 for participating in upcoming Rasta 
Rock Opera (RRO) local performances.  They never occurred due to 
YouTube’s removal of the ‘LuvYa’ video from its website and 
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replacement of the video with a false Notice claiming that the 
content of the video video [sic] violated YouTube’s Terms of 
Service.”)  But these declarations fail to provide facts to 
establish that any loss was proximately caused by defamation by 
YouTube.  The declarations do not claim that investors were 
deceived by YouTube’s false statement, believed Plaintiffs’ video 
showed inappropriate content, and as a result refused to fund 
Plaintiffs.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not established special 
damages with the requisite level of particularity.  Gomes v. 
Fried, 136 Cal. App. 3d 924, 939-40 (1982). 
B. Tortious Interference 
To establish tortious interference with prospective economic 
relationships, Plaintiffs must prove: “(1) an economic 
relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the 
probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the 
defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts 
on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the 
relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) 
economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of 
the defendant.”  Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 
Cal. 4th 1134, 1153 (2003).  Plaintiffs must also show that 
Defendants’ “conduct was wrongful by some measure other than an 
interference with the plaintiff’s interest itself.”  Della Penna 
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 376, 379 (1995).   
Plaintiffs rely on their defamation claim to establish that 
Defendants’ actions were otherwise legally wrongful.  Docket No. 
115 (Order on MTD) at 13-14.  Because Plaintiffs’ defamation 
claim fails, their tortious interference claim must also fail. 
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In addition, Plaintiffs cannot prove that Defendants knew of 
Plaintiffs’ alleged relationships and acted intentionally to harm 
those relationships.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants disrupted 
two potential economic relationships, with Nike and Precision 
Contracting Solutions (PCS).  With respect to Nike, Plaintiffs 
allege that their counsel’s July 22, 2014 letter attaching a 
draft complaint which mentioned Nike gave Defendants notice of 
Plaintiffs’ relationship with Nike.  But Plaintiffs allege that 
Nike was to hire Plaintiffs for a July 4, 2014 performance, which 
had long passed by the time Defendants received the letter and 
learned of Plaintiffs’ alleged relationship with Nike.  
Defendants therefore could not have known of Plaintiffs’ alleged 
relationship and acted intentionally to harm that relationship.  
The July 22, 2014 letter did not specifically identify PCS.  
Thus, Plaintiffs cannot establish that Defendants had knowledge 
of Plaintiffs’ relationships and acted intentionally to harm 
those relationships.  See, e.g., Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 65 
Cal. App. 3d 990, 997 (1977) (no interference claim where 
“disputed contracts had been abandoned and discontinued” months 
before defendant’s alleged wrongdoing). 
Additionally, Plaintiffs have not put forth any evidence 
that Defendants actually interfered with Plaintiffs’ 
relationships.  According to email correspondence between 
Plaintiffs and Nike, the Nike performance did not go forward 
because Nike never approved the performance in the first place 
and Nike and Plaintiffs had an unrelated dispute about trademark 
usage.  Dippo Decl., Ex. 33.  Nike officials submitted 
declarations authenticating the correspondence and corroborating 
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the statements made in that correspondence.  Declaration of Carol 
Kauffman (Kauffman Decl.) ¶¶ 2-6; Declaration of Ryan Schafer 
(Schafer Decl.) ¶¶ 2-5.  Nike officials have also stated that 
they never saw the YouTube video and that it did not factor in 
their decision.  Id.  As for PCS, it appears from Plaintiffs’ 
depositions that this company was owned and operated by Sieber’s 
son, Derrick Sieber, and that it continued to fund Plaintiffs 
until at least October 2014, which was long after this lawsuit 
was filed.  Dippo Decl., Ex. 6 (Derrick Sieber Trans.) 25:2-4; 
Dippo Decl., Ex. 3 (Rasta Rock Trans.) 54-55.  Plaintiffs have 
produced checks indicating funding through December 2014.  Dippo 
Decl., Ex. 34; Song fi Trans. 185-86, 194-95.  Plaintiffs 
themselves have submitted a declaration indicating that their 
relationship with PCS continued through at December 5, 2016.  See 
Declaration of Stephen Sieber in Support of Opposition (Sieber 
Opp. Decl.) ¶ 11.   
For all these reasons, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their 
tortious interference claim. 
II. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Exemplary 
Damages Issue and Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses 
The Court need not reach Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment on the exemplary damages issue and Defendants’ 
affirmative defenses because none of Plaintiffs’ affirmative 
claims survives.   
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 221) is 
DENIED and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 
212) is GRANTED.  The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of 
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Defendants.  Defendants shall recover their costs from 
Plaintiffs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: May 15, 2018   
CLAUDIA WILKEN 
United States District Judge 
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